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Persistence in Claim for a Tax Refund 
By H . W . ELLIS , New York Broad Street Office 
A N interesting development in a federal 
tax case recently has reached the point 
of a satisfactory settlement, which illus-
trates the importance of persistently re-
fusing to accept an improper decision from 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
and of fully considering the possibility of 
there being more than one basis of accom-
plishing the desired result when certain 
features of the case have to be abandoned. 
The " M " Company and the " N " Com-
pany were not affiliated during the year 
1919, but during the year 1920 they were 
affiliated and filed a consolidated return 
for that year. This return included ap-
proximately 375,000 net income of the " N " 
Company and the tax was paid upon the 
entire net income shown by this return. 
It was later discovered that the " N " 
Company had sustained a statutory net 
loss for the year 1919 of approximately 
3105,000 which had not been taken as a 
deduction in the 1920 return. A claim for 
refund was therefore filed, and while the 
whole 3105,000 could not be claimed as a 
deduction in the consolidated return, due to 
the fact that the company had not been 
affiliated with the " M " Company in 1919 
when the net loss was incurred, it was 
recognized that this loss could be allowed 
as a deduction to the extent of the " N " 
Company's income of 375,000 which was 
included in the 1920 consolidated return. 
But, while the Commissioner allowed the 
deduction, he did so only in part, because in 
auditing the net loss for 1919 a disallow-
ance was made for what was said to be 
"capital expenditures" amounting to about 
350,000 thus reducing the statutory net 
loss from 3105,000 to 355,000, which 
lacked 320,000 to eliminate the " N " 
Company's entire net income of 375,000. 
A second claim for refund was therefore 
made, protesting the disallowance of the 
"capital expenditures" for lack of sufficient 
explanation and identification, and also 
making claim for depreciation of 345,000 
for each of the years 1919 and 1920, which 
was admitted to be quite proper, but which 
had not been previously claimed. Either 
of these items would have eliminated the 
remainder of the " N " Company's taxable 
income of 320,000 for 1920 but for the fact 
that the second claim for refund was filed 
after the statute of limitations had expired. 
For this reason the second claim was 
entirely rejected by the Commissioner. 
It was persistently claimed however 
that the "capital expenditures" could not 
properly be disallowed until they were 
more fully identified, and it was also urged 
that if the second claim must be rejected 
because of the statute of limitation, that 
the first claim be reconsidered and that 
these items be given effect in connection 
with that claim which had been filed 
within the statute of limitation. After 
much delay this appeal was also formally 
denied, upon the ground that no issues 
could be considered other than those 
mentioned in the claim. 
A further demand was then made, either 
for a satisfactory explanation of the 
"capital expenditures" or that they be 
allowed as a deduction. The matter was 
considered again, but another formal letter 
of rejection was eventually received. 
Still, we refused to accept this as final, 
and at a later conference the matter was 
presented in a different way, by claiming 
that even if depreciation had not been one 
of the points mentioned in the first claim 
for refund, the statutory net loss had been 
claimed, and that there was no reason why 
the computation of this net loss should not 
be correctly made by including deprecia-
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tion, which was a perfectly proper deduc-
tion in such computation. 
It appears now that upon this basis an 
additional amount will be allowed by the 
Commissioner so as to eliminate all of the 
remaining taxable income of the " N " Com-
pany for 1920. The exact point which 
eventually proved to be successful there-
fore is, that while depreciation for 1920 
could not be allowed as a deduction from 
income because it was not mentioned in 
the first claim, it could be allowed as a 
deduction for 1919 in the correct com-
putation of a statutory net loss. 
